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Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage O¤ers
Kohei Kawamura and József Sákovics
The University of Edinburgh
June 2013
Abstract
We analyse a labour matching model with wage posting, where reecting
institutional constraints  rms cannot di¤erentiate their wage o¤ers within
certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we nd that the presence of impersonal
wage o¤ers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high
productivity workers who receive personalised o¤ers.
1 Introduction
This paper studies a labour market where both workers and rms are vertically dif-
ferentiated. In such a setting, if rms could o¤er a personalised wage to each worker
the outcome would be e¢ cient matching with (rm-optimal) competitive wages. In
practice, however, equal treatment is often imposed on o¤ers to certain subsets
of workers, either by law or by convenience. For example, employers in the public
sector are often required to o¤er the same or similar salaries to workers whose ob-
servable characteristics (such as education, job experience, etc.) are comparable, via
We are grateful to participants of the 2011 SIRE/BIC Microeconomic Theory Workshop at St
Andrews for their comments.
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either salary scales or a more explicit equal treatment rule.1 At the same time, the
workersproductivity is often observable by the employers (through detailed CVs,
recommendation letters, interviews etc.) who are restricted to compete in uniform
wages for workers with di¤erent productivity levels. Our analysis suggests that these
practices may have an implication not only on the wages of those who receive equal
treatment but also on the wages of workers with high productivity who typically
receive personalised o¤ers. In particular, we show that the inability to di¤erentiate
o¤ers leads to ine¢ cient matching and lower equilibrium wages than when the rms
can make an individualised o¤er to each worker.
While ine¢ ciency is limited to the matching of the equally treated, whom we call
bundledworkers, the equilibrium wages are lower than those in the competitive
equilibrium for both the bundled workers and for the workers who are more produc-
tive than them. Meanwhile, the workers receiving personalised o¤ers who are of lower
productivity than the ones who receive a bundled o¤er, continue to receive the com-
petitive wage o¤er from their e¢ cient match. In other words, the bundling creates
no downward externality.
Specically, the equilibrium o¤ers for the bundled workers result from mixed
strategies by the rms, and that necessarily leads to locally ine¢ cient matching.
It also leads to local wage compression: the wage of the least productive bundled
worker is higher while the wage of the most productive bundled worker is lower than
in a competitive equilibrium. In addition, the wages of the workers whose produc-
tivity is higher than those of the bundled workers are uniformly shifted down by the
amount of gap between the most productive bundled workers expected wage and his
1In this paper, these constraints are assumed exogenous. One possible explanation is political
pressures, especially from trade unions, towards equalityamong workers whose job grade/title is
the same. Or, particularly for low-level positions for manual work, the cost of making individualised
o¤ers may outweigh the benet of hiring (marginally) better matched workers. An alternative view
is that, since wage compression through equal treatment is desirable for rms, they might actively
coordinate to sustain it, despite the matching ine¢ ciency it generates.
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competitive wage, compared to their competitive wages. That is, wage reduction rel-
ative to competitive wages spreads across o¤ers to workers who are more productive
than the bundled workers and receive personalised o¤ers. Moreover, we show that it
is more e¢ cient and also leads to higher wages if the bundled workers are distributed
into many pairs rather than into fewer but bigger groups. We also consider the e¤ect
of a quality threshold, where the job in high productivity rms requires su¢ ciently
high skills (productivity) on the workers side. We nd that the presence of such a
quality threshold leads to less wage reduction.
The analysis of wages and matching under uniform wages was pioneered by Bu-
low and Levin (2006). They showed that when rms are unable to di¤erentiate o¤ers
at all, wages are compressed and in the aggregate they fall relative to competitive
equilibrium. At the same time, rmsprots increase, despite the presence of some
matching ine¢ ciency. Their seminal work has been extended in a number of direc-
tions. Niederle (2007) allows rms to o¤er multiple (ordered) contracts, and shows
that the rm-optimal competitive outcome is achievable in equilibrium. In a di¤erent
extension, Kojima (2007) shows that if rms have di¤erent capacities then the average
wage may exceed the competitive benchmark (and hence rmsprots may decrease).
Azevedo (2011) takes a further step and endogenises the rmscapacity choice. He
shows that impersonal wage o¤ers may yield an overall more e¢ cient outcome than
personalised wages do. Using a di¤erent framework that features continua of buyers
and sellers, Mailath, Postlewaite and Samuelson (2013) study e¢ ciency in investment
and matching with respect to personal and impersonal wages.
In a directed search model, Michelacci and Suarez (2006) investigate a related
scenario, where rms choose whether to o¤er uniform wages (for example, because
they cannot observe or measure/demonstrate in court the workersproductivities)
or to bargain with the workers, once they have observed their productivity. When
an equilibrium involving both choices exists, it is the low productivity workers who
go for the posted wage and the high productivity ones for the negotiated one. This
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produces an adverse selection e¤ect, so the presence of the negotiated deals depresses
the posted wages. However, the opposite e¤ect, which we nd in our model, is
ruled out by their assumption that in the ex post bargaining the outside options are
exogenously normalised to zero. That is, once matched, the negotiated wage between
a rm and a worker is assumed not to depend on the equilibrium, only on the workers
productivity and bargaining power.
Matching and wages are a¤ected not only by the characteristics of wage o¤ers but
also by the matching procedure itself. Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo and Romero-Medina
(1998) propose simple hiring procedures to implement a stable matching in a sub-
game perfect equilibrium where rms can make personalised o¤ers to multiple agents.
Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008) and Sákovics (2011) study alternative settings where
each rm can make a personalised o¤er to a single worker at every stage. Since our
focus is on the e¤ect of wage bundling, not on the matching procedures, we assume
a matching procedure that guarantees a stable matching in equilibrium.
In practice, heterogeneous workers in the labour market do face di¤erent wage
determination processes. Hall and Krueger (2012) document wage determination of
workers with various qualications through a survey of workers. They nd that more
educated workers are more likely to negotiate wages individually before they take up
their job, while less educated workers tend to work at posted wages that are not per-
sonalised. Brenµciµc (2012) provides consistent evidence studying job advertisements,
and moreover she nds that advertisements with posted wages are more common for
jobs that require less specic skills or experience. Since there is complete information
in our model, impersonal wages in this paper can be interpreted as wages posted for
a group of (e.g. low-skilled) workers, and personalised wage o¤ers can be thought of
as those that emerge from individual examination of each worker from a (e.g. high-
skilled) group. Our analysis points to the interaction between those two di¤erent sets
of workers.
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2 The model
Workers and rms are indexed from 1 toN , withN  3. The productivity of a worker
is his index, and productivities of rms are denoted by 0 < D1 < ::: < DN . The
output/revenue of a matched worker-rm pair is the product of their productivities.
For simplicity, outside options of the workers and rms are normalised to zero. The
rms simultaneously post a wage o¤er to each worker, but the wages for k workers are
bundled: the rms cannot wage discriminate among those workers. We have 2  k 
N . We denote the group of bundled workers by fh+ 1; :::; h+ kg, that is, we assume
that the bundled workers are of similar productivity. We denote the (N k+1)-vector
of wage o¤ers made by Firm i by W i = (wi1; :::; w
i
h; w
i; wih+k+1; :::; w
i
N), where w
i
j is
Firm is o¤er to worker j and wi is its common o¤er to the bundled workers. We
choose a simple strategic form to describe the matching procedure: once the wage
vectors o¤ered by the rms are public, the workers choose sequentially, in decreasing
order of their productivity, the wage o¤er that they want to accept (if any). Workers
always choose the remaining rm o¤ering the highest wage, and when o¤ered the
same wage by di¤erent rms they prefer to work for the most productive of those
rms. If Worker i accepts the o¤er from Firm j, both the rm and the worker exit
the market with payo¤s iDj   wji and wji ; respectively.
3 Preliminaries
It is straightforward to see that, due to the complementarity in productivities, positive
assortative matching (PAM) is the e¢ cient outcome in our model. The benchmark
result is that, without restrictions on the wage o¤ers, PAM is indeed guaranteed in
equilibrium:
Proposition 1 If rms can make personalised o¤ers to every worker, then the re-
sulting matching will be PAM, with the actual wages paid given by w1 = 0 and
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wi 2
"
i 1X
j=1
Dj;
iX
j=2
Dj
#
for i = 2; 3; :::; N: These are a subset of the competitive wages
that are given by wi 2
"
i 1X
j=1
Dj;
iX
j=1
Dj
#
for i = 1; 2; :::; N .
Proof. First, it is immediate that all workers (and rms) must get matched in
equilibrium. Next, suppose the matching were not PAM. Then we would have i; j; k; l
such that Firm i < k hires Worker j > i and Firm k hires Worker l < j. Firm k could
deviate and match is o¤er to Worker j. Worker j would prefer this wage, so that the
deviation payo¤of Firm k is at least2 jDk wij, which cannot exceed Firm ks putative
equilibrium payo¤ lDk   wkl . Similarly, Firm i could deviate by slightly outbidding
Firm ks wage o¤er to l. For this not to occur we must have jDi   wij  lDi   wkl .
Combining those two conditions we have
Di(j   l)  wij   wkl  Dk(j   l);
that is, Di  Dk, contradicting the hypothesis that i < k .
Given PAM, we know that Firm 1 will be matched withWorker 1, who is the last to
choose, so the rm can hold him to his reservation wage, which is zero. Hence, w11 = 0
and Firm 1s equilibrium payo¤ is D1: If Firm 1 hired Worker 2 for w22 + " instead,
then its payo¤would be 2D1 w22 "; which by the above argument cannot exceedD1:
Thus we have w22  D1: Note that the highest wage Firm 2 is willing to pay Worker
2 given that it could hire Worker 1 for zero is D2: As it is costless for Firm 1 to make
an o¤er to Worker 2 as long as it is not accepted, it could push up Worker 2s wage
to D2: Thus w22 2 [D1; D2]: We proceed by induction. Fix wii 2
"
i 1X
j=1
Dj;
iX
j=2
Dj
#
:
Then by the above argument we must have that iDi   wii  (i + 1)Di   wi+1i+1; and
wi+1i+1 2 [Di + wii; Di+1 + wii] =
"
iX
j=1
Dj;
i+1X
j=2
Dj
#
:
The argument for the set of competitive equilibria only di¤ers for Worker 1. There,
a rm other than Firm 1 may drive Worker 1s wage up to the maximum Firm 1 is
2The rm can guarantee this payo¤ by setting all other o¤ers to zero.
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willing to pay: D1:This then has a knock-on e¤ect on the rest of the wages by the
above logic, leading to the set of competitive wages in the statement of the proposition.
The multiplicity of equilibrium wage proles arises from the fact that the rms
can costlessly drive up the wages for workers above their equilibrium match. As can
be gleaned from the proof of Proposition 1, in order to have uniqueness, we need to
prohibit rms to make o¤ers that they would not like to be accepted.
Denition 1 Given an equilibrium, a rms wage vector is equilibrium undominated
if and only if the rms equilibrium prot is no more than the prot it would obtain
if another of its wage o¤ers were accepted.
Focusing on equilibrium undominated wage vectors, we can rule out any equilibria
supported by unaccepted wage o¤ers that would otherwise (i.e. if accepted) reduce
rmsprots, and select a unique equilibrium:
Corollary 1 There is a unique equilibrium in equilibrium undominated wage vectors,
which is the rm-optimal competitive equilibrium, with the accepted wages wci =
i 1X
j=1
Dj
for i = 1; 2; :::; N .
Our second benchmark is at the other end of the spectrum, where we have full
equal treatment: each rm has to o¤er a single wage open to all comers.
Proposition 2 (Bulow-Levin, 2006): When rms are restricted to o¤ering a sin-
gle wage, the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, with combined support
h
0; w1;NBL
i
:
There is no explicit formula for w1;NBL  wcN ; but it is well-dened via a nite algo-
rithm.
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The mixed strategy equilibrium necessarily leads to mismatch/ine¢ ciency, but
rms are still no worse o¤ than in their most favourable competitive equilibrium. As
a result, workers (in aggregate) are strictly worse o¤ due to equal treatment.
As it will become clear, it is useful to relax the denition of positive assortative
matching to t our pooled-o¤er scenario:
Denition 2 We call a matching generalised positive assortative (GPAM) if the
workers whose wages are pooled are matched with the rms from the same index set,
while the rest of the matching is PAM.
4 Equilibrium
We start by stating our main characterisation result. The rest of this section consists
of a sequence of partial characterisations that ultimately lead to the proof of the
theorem. Unlike in Bulow and Levin (2006) and just as in the case of personalised
o¤ers discussed for Corollary 1 we focus on equilibrium undominated strategies to
have a unique prediction.3
Theorem 1 The unique equilibrium outcome resulting from undominated strategies
features GPAM with the accepted wages given by wci for i 2 f1; 2; :::; hg, a mixed
strategy pooled wage à la Bulow-Levin over the interval4
h
wch+1; w
h+1;h+k
BL + w
c
h+1
i
,
3This restriction is not without loss of generality. If, say, there is ex post competition in the
product market, o¤ering wages that are equilibrium dominated could potentially harm a competitor
(by bidding up its wage bill) and thus indirectly benet the rm.
4wh+1;h+kBL corresponds to the upper bound of the mixing interval in Bulow and Levin (2006)
when there are k rms and workers, indexed between h + 1 and h + k: It can only be determined
via an algorithm, presented in Bulow and Levin (2006), and has no closed form solution.
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and
wi =

wh+1;h+kBL + w
c
h+1

+
i 1X
j=h+k
Dj =

wh+1;h+kBL + w
c
h+1

+ wci   wch+k
= wci  
h
wch+k  

wh+1;h+kBL + w
c
h+1
i
for i 2 fh+ k + 1; h+ k + 2; :::; Ng:
The main insights from the Theorem are that i) wage compressionoccurs not
only for workers who receive equal treatment but also for those who are above the
pooled range; and that ii) the equilibrium is built from down up, in the sense that
the existence of higher productivity rms/workers does not a¤ect the equilibrium
outcome of the bottom section below the bundled range. The externalities are
small even for those above the pooled range, as it is only the lower bound on wage
o¤ers that is a¤ected by the behaviour of lower productivity rms. In other words,
wage di¤erentials among the rms that hire a worker above the bundled range are
the same as those in the competitive equilibrium, while their wages in absolute terms
are lower than the competitive ones. The size of the wage reduction for every worker
above the bundled range is the di¤erence between the unbundled competitive wage of
the most productive worker in the bundle wch+k and the upper bound of the support
of wages o¤ers to the bundled workers w  wh+1;h+kBL + wch+1, which, if o¤ered, must
be accepted by Worker h+ k. We will also see later that wch+k  w; and in particular
wch+k > w if there are three or more bundled workers (i.e. k  3).
As stated earlier, we assume that the wage vectors o¤ered by the rms are public
and the workers choose sequentially, in decreasing order of their productivity. Since
workers have strict preferences, the sequential procedure leads to a unique match-
ing conditional on any wage vector, which makes the analysis of equilibrium wage
o¤ers tractable. However, by imposing a further restriction on unaccepted o¤ers in
the equilibrium wage vectors, the equilibrium outcome in the Theorem can also be
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achieved via any centralised matching procedure that leads to a stable matching.5
To prove the Theorem, we rst characterise the unique vector of accepted wages
in any equilibrium that results in GPAM. Next, we show that an equilibrium with
GPAM indeed exists. Finally, we show that there are no equilibria which do not result
in GPAM.
Our rst lemma partially characterises the wages of non-pooled workers under
GPAM:
Lemma 1 Consider any pair of adjacent workers in GPAM, i and i+1 such that i+1
(but not necessarily i) is unbundled. In any equilibrium with equilibrium undominated
wage vectors we must have wi+1 = wii +Di, where w
i
i is the upper end of the support
of Firm is (possibly mixed) o¤er strategy to Worker i:
Proof. First note that the o¤er to an unbundled worker must be in pure strategy,
since in GPAM it is common knowledge whose o¤er will be accepted. Next, note that
in equilibrium Firm i must not strictly prefer hiring Worker i + 1 at wi+1 to hiring
Worker i at wii. Thus we have iDi   wii  (i + 1)Di   wi+1 ) wi+1  wii + Di. The
only reason to bid more than that would be if another rm (with a smaller index)
would be o¤ering more as well. However, that would be loss making if accepted, and
thus it is ruled out by the equilibrium undominated wages restriction. Hence we have
wi+1 = w
i
i +Di.
5To see this, x the accepted equilibrium wages in the Theorem and suppose further that each
rm makes o¤ers to unmatched workers in such a way that, if accepted, the o¤ers to the workers
above the matched worker generate the same prots as their equilibrium prots, and the o¤ers to
the workers below him are the same as their accepted wages in the equilibrium. This implies that
all workers have the same preference ordering for the rms (i.e. a more productive rm is better)
and hence the stable matching conditional on the wage proles is unique (e.g. Clark, 2006). Just as
in the case of the sequential procedure, the rms do not have incentive to deviate.
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It is easy to see that any o¤ers to bundled workers that have a positive probability
of being accepted must be in mixed strategies. If there was an equilibrium in pure
strategies, then a more productive rm would prefer to match a less productive rms
bundled o¤er, while the lesser rm would want either to strictly undercut thereby
hiring the same worker as if she matched the higher rms o¤er but at a lower wage
or o¤er more, leapfrogging the better rm.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium with equilibrium undominated wage vectors that results
in GPAM, the rms hiring the bundled workers fh+ 1; :::; h+ kg play a Bulow-Levin
mixed strategy equilibrium over the support [wh +Dh; w
h+1;h+k
BL + wh +Dh].
Proof. In GPAM Firms h + 1; :::; h + k play mixed strategies for the workers
whose wages are bundled. Standard arguments imply that i) the support must be
continuous; ii) two or more rms make o¤ers anywhere on the support; and iii) there
is no atom except for the bottom of the support.
Suppose that the lower bound of the support were less than wh + Dh: Then by
o¤ering whh+1 = wh + Dh   ", Firm h would have a positive probability of hiring a
worker of productivity no less than h+1; leading to a higher prot than in equilibrium.
At the same time the lower bound cannot be higher than wh + Dh; since then the
rms would strictly prefer to bid less than the lower bound to o¤ering the lower bound
(as they would hire Worker h + 1 anyway, but for less). Because of the equilibrium
undominated wages assumption, no rm below h+ 1 o¤ers a higher wage.
Due to GPAM, the bundled wage o¤ers made by Firms i > h + k do not a¤ect
the outcome, so that the rest follows from Proposition 2 above. It follows from the
Bulow-Levin algorithm for the computation of the mixed strategies that, since the
lowest wage bid here is wh+Dh instead of zero, all o¤er densities by the mixing rms
simply shift upwards by wh +Dh.
We are now ready to complete the proof of the Theorem:
11
Proof of the Theorem. We rst show that there is an equilibrium that
features GPAM. Consider the wages according to Theorem 1, with wii+1 = wi+1 for
i 2 f1; 2; :::; h; h + k + 1; h + k + 2; :::; N   1g and the rest of the wage o¤ers to
unbundled workers equal to zero.
Note that by construction the wage di¤erentials among the unbundled workers are
such that no rm matched with an unbundled worker has incentive to deviate and
attract another unbundled worker by matching his wage. Each unbundled worker
(except Worker 1) receives the same two identical o¤ers, and they choose the one from
the more productive rm. Lemma 2 ensures that no rm matched with a bundled
worker has incentive to change its mixed o¤ers to hire a bundled worker.
It remains to be shown that, with respect to the strategy prole, no rm matched
with an unbundled worker has incentive to hire a bundled worker instead; and that
no rm matched with a bundled worker has incentive to hire an unbundled worker
instead.
Firm j 2 fh+1; h+2; :::; h+kg matched with a bundled worker cannot gain from
hiring any unbundled worker h or below instead: the deviation prot is bounded by
hiring Worker h at wch; but by construction the Bulow-Levin mixed strategy guar-
antees an expected prot equal to hiring Worker h + 1 at wch+1, which is higher
for any Firm j > h. Likewise, Firm j 2 fh + 1; h + 2; :::; h + kg cannot gain
from hiring any unbundled Worker l 2 fh + k + 1; h + k + 2; :::; Ng: the devia-
tion prot is bounded by hiring Worker h + k + 1 at a wage slightly higher than
wch+k+1  
h
wch+k  

wh+1;h+kBL + w
c
h+1
i
, but by construction the Bulow-Levin mixed
strategy guarantees an expected prot equal to hiring Worker h+k at wh+1;h+kBL +w
c
h+1,
which is strictly higher for any Firm j  h+ k.
Also, no rm matched with an unbundled worker would prot from deviating and
hiring a bundled worker. Firms i 2 f1; 2; :::; hg would have to bid more than wch+1
to attract a bundled worker. However, Firm h + 1 (who is mixing) is indi¤erent
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to making such a raise which implies that rms below it are strictly worse o¤ than
o¤ering exactly wch+1 and hiring Worker h+1: By the construction of the competitive
wages they are at best indi¤erent between the resulting payo¤ and their putative
equilibrium payo¤. Similarly, Firms l 2 fh + k + 1; h + k + 2; :::; Ng would be at
best indi¤erent between hiring Worker h + k at wh+1;h+kBL + w
c
h+1 and their putative
equilibrium payo¤. Moreover, Firm h + k (who is mixing) is indi¤erent to o¤ering a
lower wage to the bundled workers, which implies that such a lowering would strictly
decrease the expected payo¤ of any Firm l 2 fh+ k + 1; h+ k + 2; :::; Ng:
So far we have established that GPAM is an equilibrium outcome, in which the
accepted wages must be those specied in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Finally, we
show that any equilibrium allocation must feature GPAM. If the bundled workers
are matched with the rms of the same index set then the rest of the matching
must be PAM, by the argument establishing PAM in the proof of Proposition 1.
Thus, all we need to show is that a bundled worker cannot be matched with a rm
outside of the index set of the bundled workers in equilibrium. Suppose that in
equilibrium Firm i 2 f1; :::; hg hires Worker g 2 fh + 1; :::; h + kg. Then it must be
that some Firm j 2 fh+1; :::; h+kg hires either i) Worker l 2 f1; :::; hg; or ii) Worker
m 2 fh+ k + 1; :::; Ng.
Consider Case i). The equilibrium wage o¤ers to the bundled workers cannot be
in pure strategy, so Firm i must adopt a mixed strategy, being indi¤erent among all
of its o¤ers made to the bundled workers. Let the highest wage in the support of Firm
is mixing be wi. Let the expected worker index when rm i o¤ers wi be ( wi). Then
Firm j could deviate and o¤er wi, which gives the expected worker index of at least
( wi). Thus the deviation payo¤ is at least ( wi)Dj   wi, which cannot exceed rm
js putative equilibrium payo¤ lDj wjl , that is, ( wi)Dj  wi  lDj wjl . Similarly,
Firm i could deviate by o¤ering a single wage, which just exceeds wjl . Note that Firm
is expected payo¤ is the same regardless of the (mixed) o¤er it makes in equilibrium.
Hence it must be that ( wi)Di  wi  lDi wjl . Combining those two conditions we
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have
Di(( w
i)  l)  Dj(( wi)  l);
contradicting the hypothesis that j > i.
Consider Case ii). Now in order for Firm j not to deviate and make an (only)
o¤er to the bundled workers equal to wi; we must have mDj   wjm  ( wi)Dj   wi,
and Firm is no deviation condition is ( wi)Di   wi  mDi   wjm. Combining both
we obtain
Di(m  ( wi))  Dj(m  ( wi));
contradicting the hypothesis that j > i.
5 The e¤ects of bundling restrictions
So far we have assumed that there is only one class of bundled workers from h+ 1 to
h + k, but clearly Theorem 1 can be extended to the cases where there are multiple
groups of bundled workers, as long as each bundle consists of workers with consecutive
indices. The number and size of the bundles have important implications for payo¤s
and e¢ ciency. As it will become clear, the case of pairs of workers receiving a common
wage is qualitatively di¤erent from the cases where three or more workers are bundled.
We start with the former case.
5.1 Bundles of two
Our rst observation is that a two-worker bundle has no externalities on the remaining
matches and wages.
Corollary 2 When there are two bundled workers, namely Workers h+ 1 and h+ 2,
the upper bound of the common wage distribution is w = wch + Dh + Dh+1 = w
c
h+2,
which is the rm-optimal competitive wage for Worker h+ 2:
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Proof. Let us have a closer look at the mixed strategy equilibrium, with mixing
densities denoted by fi(w) for Firm i. Note that the benet from o¤ering a slightly
higher wage w + dw than w is given by Dj
P
i 6=j fi(w)  dw, while the additional cost
is dw. Thus for any w in the support, there must be two or more consecutive rms
within fh+ 1; :::; h+ kg that actually o¤er w, and the density functions of the mixed
strategies for those mixing rms j solve
Dj
X
i 6=j
fi(w) = 1. (1)
If there are two bundled workers, the solution is given by fh+1 = 1=Dh+2 and fh+2 =
1=Dh+1. As both rms must mix over the same range and the only mass point is
for the weaker rm at the lower bound, Firm h + 2 mixes uniformly over [wch+1; w],
implying that w = wch+1 +Dh+1 = w
c
h+2.
The corollary implies that when only two workers are bundled, the support of
the mixed strategies is between the two competitive wages that correspond to the
respective workers (h + 1 and h + 2). By bidding wci Firm i (i 2 fh + 1; h +
2g) is matched with the same worker as in the competitive equilibrium. Therefore
the expected prots of both rms are the same as in the rm-optimal competitive
equilibrium. Meanwhile, clearly the expected wage for Worker h+1 is higher, and for
Worker h + 2 is lower relative to their competitive wages. It is immediate that the
workers as a group are worse o¤since they bear the cost of the potential ine¢ ciency
of the match and, therefore, the expected gain of Worker h + 1 must be less than
the expected loss of Worker h+ 2:
The remaining question we wish to answer is: Conditional on there being a two-
bundle, where should it be to maximise welfare?
Corollary 3 The least ine¢ cient two-bundle is at arg min
h
Dh+1
Dh+2
(Dh+2  Dh+1) :
Proof. The probability of an ine¢ cient match is the probability that the more
productive rmmakes the lower bundled o¤er:
R wch+1
wch
fh+1(x)Fh+2(x)dx =
R wch+1
wch
1
Dh+2

15
x wch
Dh+1
dx =
(wch+1 wch)
2
Dh+1Dh+2
= (Dh+1)
2
Dh+1Dh+2
= Dh+1
Dh+2
: The deadweight loss of the mismatch is
(h + 2)Dh+2 + (h + 1)Dh+1   (h + 1)Dh+2   (h + 2)Dh+1 = Dh+2  Dh+1: Thus the
expected loss due to mismatch (the only ine¢ ciency) is Dh+1
Dh+2
(Dh+2  Dh+1) :
Note that Dh+1
Dh+2
(Dh+2  Dh+1) = Dh+1Dh+1+(Dh+2 Dh+1) (Dh+2  Dh+1) is increasing in
Dh+2  Dh+1: Thus a su¢ cient condition for the optimality of bundling the bottom
two workers is that the di¤erence between productivities is non-decreasing in h.
Finally, it is important to observe that Corollary 2 generalises to any number of
size two bundles, by the very nature of the result that there are no externalities. In
line with Corollary 3, all the size two bundles should happen at the bottom of the
distribution if the di¤erence between productivities is non-decreasing in h:
5.2 Large bundles
Before we derive the o¤er distribution when k  3, let us rst present the following
result, which says that for any wage in the mixed range, the o¤ers by rms with higher
productivity rst-order stochastically dominate those by rms with lower productivity
(c.f. Lemma 1 in Bulow and Levin, 2006).
Lemma 3 If Dj > Dl, then in equilibrium for all w, Fj(w)  Fl(w).
Recall that we denote the upper bound of the mixed wage o¤ers by w, which, if
o¤ered must be taken by the most productive bundled worker, h+k. Using the above
lemma we can show that larger bundles lead to further wage compression:
Corollary 4 If k  3, then w < wch+k:
Proof. Let Vj be Firm js prot with Worker j at wcj , and notice that the
di¤erence in prots that Firm h+ 1 and Firm j such that j 2 fh+ 2; :::; h+ kg make
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in the rm-optimal competitive equilibrium is given by Vj   Vh+1 = (Dj   Dh+1)j.
Instead, in equilibrium the di¤erence is given by
j(w^h+1)  h+1(w^h+1) = Dj  j  Dh+1  [j + Fj(w^h+1)  Fh+1(w^h+1)]
= (Dj  Dh+1)j +Dh+1 [Fh+1(w^h+1)  Fj(w^h+1)] ;
where w^h+1 denotes the upper end of the support of Firm h + 1s strategy. From
Lemma 3 the o¤ers by a higher rm stochastically dominate those by a lower rm,
so that the second term is non-negative. Thus we have j   h+1  Vj   Vh+1. We
can guarantee a strict inequality if the upper bound of Firm h + 10s o¤er is below
w: By construction the (expected) prot of Firm h+ 1 is the same whether or not a
personalised o¤er to Worker h + 1 is possible. Therefore, the expected prots of all
other rms matched with bundled workers are weakly higher than those under the
rm-optimal competitive equilibrium. Since a mixing rms expected prot is the
same for any wage o¤er it makes with positive probability, any rm that expects to
hire a worse worker than in the e¢ cient match (with positive probability) must o¤er
strictly lower wages than the rm-optimal competitive one.
Thus, all we have left to show is that if there are at least three bundled workers,
the highest o¤er Firm h + 1 makes is strictly below w: The solution of (1) if all the
rms bid over the same support is fi(w) = 1k
Ph+k
j=h+1D
 1
j  D 1i : It is straightforward
to see that fh+1(w) < 0; contradicting the hypothesis that all rms bid over the same
support. By Lemma 3 it must be that Firm h+ 1 does not bid near w:
Theorem 1 and Corollary 4 imply that, if k  3, the wages of the more productive
workers (strictly above h+ k) who receive personalised o¤ers are reduced relative to
the competitive wages, but the wage di¤erentials among them are the same.
Again, given the non-externality result of Theorem 1, for rms and workers in
the bundle, Propositions 2 and 3 of Bulow and Levin (2006) apply: all rms except
Firm h + 1 enjoy a strict expected gain, while Firm h + 1 is indi¤erent; given this
and the resulting ine¢ ciency, workers are strictly worse o¤ in the aggregate but lower
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productivity workers (h+1 for sure) benet. The novelty here is that the lower wages
propagate to the high productivity rms hiring with personalised wages. That is, all
the rms above h+k are strictly better o¤ by exactly as much as Firm h+k is (since
they hire the same worker as with personalised wages, but for wch+k   wh+1;h+kBL > 0
less). Naturally the opposite is the case for the high productivity workers above h+k.
6 Quality thresholds
Our analysis so far has assumed that every rms output is the product of Di and
its workers index. In practice, it may be that tasks involved in a high productivity
rm/job requires particular (high) skills in order to produce anything at all. This
section considers how such a quality threshold may a¤ect our results. Suppose for
simplicity that the output is zero if Firm i is matched with a worker of index i  q or
below, where q 2 f1; 2; :::; i  1g.
If there is no bundling, this restriction does not a¤ect the matching (PAM) or rm-
optimal wages because, focusing on equilibrium undominated strategies, the equilib-
rium wage of Worker i is determined in such a way that Firm i is indi¤erent between
hiring Worker i and Worker i+ 1. In other words, Firm i+ 1s o¤er to Worker i does
not play a role in equilibrium whether or not it can produce positive output with the
Worker i, since it is better o¤ hiring Worker i + 1 by matching the (rational) o¤er
from Firm i, than to hire Worker i (or lower) by matching the o¤ers he has received
from rms below i+1. This feature comes from the supermodularity of output, which
implies the output di¤erential between Worker i and Worker i + 1 is larger for Firm
i+ 1 than for Firm i.
Consider the e¤ect of quality threshold on the match and wages of bundled work-
ers. If q  k, that is, if the threshold is relatively low, then the quality thresh-
old does not change the equilibrium matching and wages with bundling. This is
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because i) from the above argument the equilibrium wages for Workers 1; :::; h are
not a¤ected; and because ii) the equilibrium wage of Worker h + k + 1 is deter-
mined by Firm h + ks incentive to bid for Worker h + k + 1, which is to make it
indi¤erent between hiring a bundled worker and hiring Worker h + k + 1 for cer-
tain. This means the quality threshold is irrelevant for the equilibrium construc-
tion, and we have wh+k+1 = w
h+1;h+k
BL + w
c
h+1 + Dh+k, and hence as we have seen
in Theorem 1, wi = w
h+1;h+k
BL + w
c
h+1 +
h+k+i 1X
j=h+k
Dj = w
c
i  

wch+k   wh+1;h+kBL

for
i 2 fh+ k + 1; h+ k + 2; :::; Ng.
If q < k, that is, if the threshold is tight, then the situation becomes di¤erent. Due
to equal treatment, a rm o¤ering a bundled wage runs the risk of hiring a worker who
is completely unproductive. This will lead to relatively aggressive bidding by more
productive rms o¤ering bundled wages, and as a result the matching ine¢ ciency is
reduced. To see this, consider the following example where Workers h and h+ 1 are
bundled and the workers are not productive in a rm above their index (q = 1). Now
the equilibrium o¤er densities of the respective rms are given by fh+1 = 1(h+2)Dh+2
and fh+2 = 1Dh+1 . Firm h+ 2s o¤er density is the same as in the case where there is
no quality threshold, which implies the support of the o¤ers also remains unchanged.
However, the density of Firm h + 1 is lower than in the case without the quality
threshold (and hence has a larger mass at wch+1). Consequently Firm h + 2 is more
likely to be matched with Worker h+ 2.
The probability of mismatch is given by
R wch+1
wch
fh+1(x)Fh+2(x)dx =
R wch+1
wch
1
(h+2)Dh+2

x wch
Dh+1
dx =
(wch+1 wch)
2
Dh+1Dh+2
= (Dh+1)
2
Dh+1Dh+2
= Dh+1
(h+2)Dh+2
: The deadweight loss of the mismatch
is (h+ 2)Dh+2+ (h+ 1)Dh+1  (h+ 2)Dh+1 = (h+ 2)Dh+2 Dh+1: Thus the expected
loss due to mismatch (the only ine¢ ciency) is Dh+1
(h+2)Dh+2
((h+ 2)Dh+2  Dh+1) =
Dh+1
Dh+2
(Dh+2   Dh+1h+2 ). Since the expected loss from mismatch in the case with no
quality threshold is Dh+1
Dh+2
(Dh+2  Dh+1),6 we can see that the cost of the loss in pro-
6See the proof of Corollary 3.
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duction from mismatch outweighs the e¢ ciency gain from the reduced probability of
mismatch.
When a bundle contains three or more workers/rms, the upper end of the wage
distribution (of the bundled workers) becomes higher in the presence of a quality
threshold. The o¤er densities for q = 1 with three types are as follows:
fh+1 =
1
(h+ 2)Dh+2
for wh+2 2 [wch+1; wch+1 +Dh+1  
Dh+1Dh+2
(h+ 3)Dh+3
] with mass at 0
fh+2 =
8<: 1Dh+1 for wh+2 2 [wch+1; wch+1 +Dh+1  
Dh+1Dh+2
(h+3)Dh+3
]
1
(h+3)Dh+3
for wh+3 2 [wch+1 +Dh+1   Dh+1Dh+2(h+3)Dh+3 ; wch+1 +Dh+1  
Dh+1Dh+2
(h+3)Dh+3
+Dh+2]
fh+3 =
1
Dh+2
for wh+3 2 [wch+1 +Dh+1  
Dh+1Dh+2
(h+ 3)Dh+3
; wch+1 +Dh+1  
Dh+1Dh+2
(h+ 3)Dh+3
+Dh+2]:
Without the quality threshold, the densities are
fh+1 =
1
Dh+2
for wh+2 2 [wch+1; wch+1 +Dh+1  
Dh+1Dh+2
Dh+3
] with mass at 0
fh+2 =
8<: 1Dh+1 for wh+2 2 [wch+1; wch+1 +Dh+1  
Dh+1Dh+2
Dh+3
]
1
Dh+3
for wh+3 2 [wch+1 +Dh+1   Dh+1Dh+2Dh+3 ; wch+1 +Dh+1  
Dh+1Dh+2
Dh+3
+Dh+2]
fh+3 =
1
Dh+2
for wh+3 2 [wch+1 +Dh+1  
Dh+1Dh+2
Dh+3
; wch+1 +Dh+1  
Dh+1Dh+2
Dh+3
+Dh+2]:
Therefore it is easy to see that the upper bound of the mixing support is higher
with quality threshold, though still lower than in the rm-optimal competitive equi-
librium.7 From Theorem 1 we know that the size of the wage reduction for every
worker above the bundled range is the di¤erence between the unbundled competitive
wage of the most productive worker in the bundle, wch+k, and the upper bound of the
support of wages o¤ers to the bundled workers w  wh+1;h+kBL + wch+1. This implies
that the wage reduction e¤ect for the workers above the bundled workers is weaker,
when there is a quality threshold.
7Following the notation for Theorem 1, in the absence of the threshold the upper bound of the
support is given by wch+1 + w
h+1;h+3
BL = w
c
h+1 +Dh+1   Dh+1Dh+2Dh+3 +Dh+2.
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7 Conclusion
Wage determination processes vary according to worker types: while high-skilled
workers receive personalised (often negotiated) wages, many low-skilled workers work
at posted wages that do not di¤erentiate between workers with slightly di¤erent quali-
cations or productivities. We have rigorously shown that the models of personalised
and bundled wages can be integrated seamlessly. We have also demonstrated how
those two di¤erent wage determination processes can interact with each other. In
particular, impersonal wage o¤ers lead to wage compression, which propagates to the
wages for high productivity workers (and rms).
We have also derived comparative statics results about the size and number of
bundles. Under reasonable assumptions on productivities, bundling is more e¢ cient
 or rather less ine¢ cient  at lower levels of productivity. This is in line with
the wide-spread salary policy of paying uniform wages at entry level positions but
personalised ones higher up the echelon (Hall and Krueger, 2012; Brenµciµc, 2012).
Throughout this paper we have focused on undominated wage o¤ers (hence rm-
optimal competitive wages) for unbundled workers. If competing rms had an incen-
tive to reduce the prots of others say, because they competed in the same product
market , then the wages could be higher than the rm-optimal competitive level
even if such incentive were very small.
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